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Abstract
This paper takes a novel approach to derive a central bank intervention reaction function.
A GARCH model for exchange rates is amended to allow interventions to have an effect on both
the mean ànd the variance of exchange rate retums. An intervention reaction function is obtained
by combining the model with a loss function for the central bank. Estimation results for the
implied friction model reproduce the familiar "leaning against the wind" policy by the Bundesbank
and the Federal Reserve. Furthermore, the central banks appeaz to have reacted to increases in the
conditional vaziance of daily DMIá-returns.
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1~Ve are grateful to the Deutsche Bundesbank, Hauptabteilung Ausland for kindly providing
the daily data on the official interventions of the Bundesbank on a confidential base and to the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Division of Intetnational Finance for kindly
providing the daily data on the official interventions of the Federal Reserve System. Bertrand
Melenberg has been extremely helpful to us in obtaining the estimation results reported in the
paper. Furthermore, the paper benefitted from comments made by Frank de ]ong. Opinions and
errors are our own responsibility. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the Royal
Economic Society Conference, Exeter, United Kingdom, March 28-31, 1994.I
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed ezchange rate system in the early 1970s,
the ezchange value of the major currencies in the industrialized world is in principle determined
by market forces. However, in the present system of managed floating the exchange rate is not the
outcome of supply and demand by private market participants only. The monetary authorities of
many countries have frequently been trying to influence the relative value of their currency by
means of exchange market interventions. To comply with Article IV of the Articles of Agreement
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as amended in 1978 central banks are obliged to pro-
mote a stable ezchange rate system and hence to "counter disorderly exchange market conditions".
This paper reports on the results of an empirical investigation into the objectives of
foreign exchange mazket intervention by the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System in the
Deutsche Mazk-U.S. dollar market and the Japanese yen-U.S. dollar market. The sample period
considered is the post-Louvre period February 23, 1987 to October 31, 1989. The paper takes a
novel approach in the sense that the intervention reaction function is derived formally rather than
stated ad hoc. Furthermore, daily intervention data are used. Inspection of the data reveals that the
central banks abstain from intervention on the majority of trading days in the sample. To
overcome this problem, a friction model is employed to estimate the intervention reaction function
consistently.
The majority of previous empirical investigations into the objectives of central bank
intervention formulate the reaction function rather ad hoc (see, e.g. Almekinders and Eijffinger
(1994). For a comprehensive survey see Almekinders and Eijffinger (1991) and Edison (1993)).
This paper takes a novel approach. In section I of this study the intervention reaction function is
derived formally. First, we amend the popular GARCH model for the exchange rate to allow
interventions to have an effect on both the tnean ànd the variance of exchange rate returns. Then,
a policy loss function for the central bank is combined with this exchange rate model to derive the
interventiion reaction function. Official purchases (sales) of foreign currency by the domestic
central bank appear to depend on two variables. The model implies that they are positively related
to the expected fall (rise) of the ezchange rate below (above) the tazget level pursued by central
banks and on the volatiliry of the exchange rate conditional on no intervention.
Section II describes the daily data on exchange rates and intervention we use to investigate
the objectives of Bundesbank and Federal Reserve intervention. Furtherrnore, it introduces the
explanatory variables used in the empirical implementation of the model in section III.
In practice, central banks are rather reluctant to intervene in the foreign exchange market.
By abstaining from intervention in the face of stnall changes in the ezchange rate and normal
levels of conditional volatility the central banks can be viewed as "investing" in the potential
effectiveness of interventions to be undertaken at times the foreign exchange market experiences
some serious turbulence. This feature of intervention behaviour makes the standard linear
regression model an inappropriate tool for estimating the derived reaction function.
To capture adequately this aspect of central banks' behaviour, we employ a friction model2
due to Rosett (1959) in which the dependent variable is zero as long as the independent variables
remain "close" to their desired levels. The central banks' tolerance threshold for deviations of the
explanatory variables from their desired levels is one of the parameters in the model.
The estimation results reproduce the familiar "leaning against the wind" policy by the
Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve. Furthermore, an increase in the conditional
vaziance of daily DMIS-returns is found to have led both central banks to increase the volume of
intervention. Finally, the estimation results point to some interesting asymmetries in the interventi-
on behaviour of the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve.
I. T6e Model
Neumann (1984) implements a flow market model for the determination of the exchange
rate. He derives an intervention reaction function according to which the central bank of the home
country supplies amounts of home currency to the foreign exchange market when the exchange
rate of Ihe foreign currency in terms of the home currency is lower than the target rate (S, G S,~'
and when an increase in the expected risk premium on assets denominated in the home curcency
raises speculative demand for that currency. It should be noticed that the serious measurement
problems surrounding "risk premiums" are well established. More importantly, the flow market
model and other structural models for exchange rate determination are rejected in empirical tests.2
This has led many economists to adopt new research strategies in exploring the field of exchange
rate economics.
By now, it is well established that a GARCH model offers a parsimonious description of
the stochastic process of daily spot exchange rate returns (see, e.g. Baillie and Bollerslev
(1989)).' This paper focusses on the motives for central bank intervention. Accordingly, it is
assumed that interventions can alter both the mean and the conditional variance of daily exchange
'Throughout the paper the exchange rate, S„ is defined as the domestic currency price of one
unit of foreign exchange. Subscript t denotes time and lower case letters refer to natural loga-
rithms of variables. Greek letters denote positive constants.
2After surveying the empirical evidence on exchange rate models, MacDonald and Taylor
(1992, p. 24) conclude that "...the asset approach models have performed well for some time
periods, such as the interwar period, and, to some extent, for the first part of the recent floating
experience (that is, 1973-1978); but they have provided largely inadequate explanations for the
behavior of the major ezchange rates during the latter part of the float".
'GARCH stands for Generalized Autoregressive Conditionally Heteroscedastia The purport of
the meanwhile extensive GARCH literature, surveyed in Bollerslev et al. (1992), is that volatility
in daily returns is predictable in most financial mazkets. In several applications it has been shown
that there is a considerable persistence in the effects of shocks in period t onto the conditional
variance of exchange rates in consecutive periods.3
rate returns. Furthermore, the postulated stochastic process for the ezchange rate allows for a
GARCH-in-Mean effecr.
A s, - a„ t S, INV, - ry DUM, h, t e, . e,~ f;-, -N (0, h,1 (la)
h, - r- b2 DUM, INV, . a e;-, t a h,-, (lb)
DUM, - 1(-1) if p S ~ G 0(z 0) (lc)
All GARCH models in this paper are expressed in closing exchange rates (S`h. It follows that the
dependent variable in (la) is the ezchange rate return over the 24 hours period from the closing of
the foreign exchange market on day t-1 until day t's closing. Equation (la) characterizes the mean
of the stochastic process which generates the exchange rate return series. ao denotes a constant
rate of appreciation of foreign currency. INV, is the volume of intervention defined as purchases of
foreign currency by the domestic central bank. Interventions are effective if S, 1 0 implying that
purchases (sales) of foreign currency by the domestic central bank lead to a higher (lower)
exchange value of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency. e, is the residual of the mean
equation. It is indicated to have a conditional normal distribution with mean zero and vaziance h,.
The symbol fl,-, denotes the information available to exchange market participants at the beginning
of the relevant interval for which the exchange rate teturn is calculated: at the closing of the
foreign exchange market on day t-1. When measured over a sufficiently long period, the constant
rate of appreciation of domestic currency ao may be approximately zero. Then, large drops in the
exchange rate correspond with large negative realizations of e,-„ e,-2, etc.. In case of bandwagon
expectations among private ezchange market participants, these may lead to a further decline of
the exchange rate: the GARCH-in-Mean effect. When the exchange rate was falling (rising) in the
previous period(s), a high conditional variance is likely to lead to a larger fall (rise) in the current
period. Hence DUM, - 1(DUM, --1) in case of a falling (rising) exchange rate. Equation (lb)
defines the variance equation (h,). Due to the inclusion of the volume of intervention premultiplied
by a dummy variable, this equation can capture the effect of both official sales and purchases of
foreign currency. At first glance, less exchange rate volatility and uncertainty seems to be prefera-
ble for society as a whole." Hence, interventions are effective if óz 1 0. With the dummy
variable defined as in equation (lc), this indicates that both purchases and sales of foreign
"Of course, one can easily think of situations in which central banks prefer a higher degree of
uncertainty regarding the future course of currency movements. According to Blundell-Wignall
and Masson (1985, p.156) "...it may be a deliberate part of an intervention strategy to change the
degree of uncertainty concerning exchange rate fluctuations: either by limiting transitory
fluctuations and hence providing a more stable planning environment, or by adding an erratic
element to exchange rate movements, to discourage speculation".4
currency lower the volatility of returns on the foreign exchange market. Presumably, the
interventions work through the expectations channel. They may curb the bandwagon expectations
and lead to a lowering of the conditional variance. In turn, the dampening effeca of interventions
on the conditional variance may lead to sntaller daily returns on the foreign exchange tnarket, ify
is significantly larger than zero.
Suppose the central bank wishes to limit deviations of the exchange rate from a target
level (s,~.' Its expected policy loss increases more than proportionally with both positive and
negative deviations from the target level:
E,, L,cK - E,,(s, - s,r)z (2)
To capture intervention carried out on account of a"leaning against the wind" policy, the tazget
level for the exchange rate can be thought of as representing past levels of the exchange rate. This
follows immediately from the definition of smoothing exchange rate Fluctuations: whether or not
the exchange rate was considered to be at a desirable (or tazget) level in the previous period(s),
deviations from this level will be countered.
Minimizing Ihe loss function (2) by choosing INV, subject to the constraints implied by the
stochastic process of the exchange rate described by (la)-(lc) leads to the following intervention
reaction function for the central bank:b~'
where
:
INV, - Sz2~i DUM, - ~i (s,-i ' ao - s~T) -~i Y DUM, (n ; a E~-~ t R h~-i) (3)
and
~, - l ~(S, t Y SZ)
DUM, - 1(-1) if p s~ c 0(;? 0)
SOf course, the conduct of exchange rate policy is not the only issue of concern for a central
bank. Neumann (1984) proposes a central bank policy loss function which accounts for a trade-off
between controlling the monetary base on the one hand and the exchange rate on the other hand.
However, in most large industrialized countries the monetary authorities give priority to domestic
policy objectives and use instruments of monetary policy to attain these objectives. By definition,
sterilized interventions lack a money market effect (cf. Pilbeam (1991, p. 106)). Therefore, it may
be an appropriate simplification to focus on [he motives for sterilized interventions in the spot
market for foreign exchange.
RGiven that the variance of a random variable X can be expressed as Var(X)-E(XI)-(EX)r,
from (2), E,., (s, - s,~2 can be rewritten as follows
E,.i[(s, - s,T)Z] -[E,-i(s, - s,7)~ i Var,-,(s, - s,T) - [s,-i - s,~ t ao f Si ~NV, - y DUM, h,~ t h,
'The second-order conditions for a minimum are met. Given the quadratic form of the loss
function, the minimum is global.5
According to equation (3) the volume of intervention depettds on a constant term which is positive
(negative) when the exchange rate was falling (rising) in the previous period. Futthermore, official
purchases (sales) of foreign currency by the domestic central bank depend positively on the fall
(rise) of the exchange rate below (above) the target level, which is expected to occur during
period t conditional on no intervention. Finally, an increase in the conditional variance of the
exchange rate (again, conditional on no intervention) leads the domestic central bank ceteris
paribus either to buy or sell more foreign currency depending on whether the course of the level
ofthe exchange rate calls for purchases or sales of foreign currency.
II. The Data
In this section we turn to an empirical study of the reaction function for daily interventions
by the Deutsche Bundesbank in the spot Deutsche Mark-U.S. dollaz exchange market and by the
Federal Reserve System in the spot Deutsche Mark-U.S. dollar exchange market and [he spot
Japanese yen-U.S. dollar exchange market.e For that we must take account of the development of
the respective exchange rates between successive days (interday), as well as in the course of these
days (intraday).' [n this study, when we look at the objectives of Bundesbank interventions the
intraday development in the DMI~-tnarket is approximated by three observations per day in the
Frankfurt markeL
l. the opening rate (primo) at 8.30 hours (Frankfurt time), SFR,a.m:
2. the fixing rate (official middle rate) at 13.00 hours (Frankfurt time) SFR,";
3. the closing rate (ultimo) at 16.30 hours (Frankfurt time), SFR,~"M.
Furthermore, the study makes use of daily observations for interventions by the Deutsche
Bundesbank expressed in millions of U.S. dollars."' When we investigate the objectives of
Federal Reserve intervention the intraday development in the DMIá-market and the yenla-market
are approximated by four observations per day in the New York mazket:
I. the opening rate at 9.00 hours (New York time), SNY,';
'Unfortunately, we were not able to investigate empirically the reaction function for daily
interventions by the Bank of Japan in the spot U.S. dollar-Japanese yen exchange market. The
lapanese monetary au[horities stick to a policy of s[rict confidentiality regarding intervention data.
'Goodhart and Hesse (1993) assess central bank foreign exchange market intervention virtually
in continuous time. However, their investigations are based on reported intervention observations
which appeared on Reuters screen infotmation. This gives a far from exact representation of ac-
tual intervention operations (Klein (1992), Osterberg and Wetmore Humes (1993). Moreover, re-
ported intervention observations do not contain inforrrtation on the actual amount of intervention.
'oOriginally, the Bundesbank intervention data are expressed in millions of Deutsche Mazks.
We computed their dollar value by dividing the DM value of day t's intervention by the opening
rate of the U.S. dollar in Frankfurt on day t.?. the tirst middle rate at 12.00 hours (New York time), SNY,11~
3. the second middle rate at 14.00 hours (New York time), SNY,"~
4. the closing rate at 16.00 hours (New York time), SNY,16.
Furthermore, the study makes use of daily observations for Federal Reserve interventions in the
DMIS- and yenl~-exchange market expressed in millions of U.S. dollars.
In the model presented above a time subscript was attached to the symbol denoting the
target exchange rate. This indicates that it is allowed to vary over time. Obviously, when the
domestic central bank continues to direct intervention at a fixed target level for the exchange rate
while the actual exchange rate is being driven up (i.e., the value of the domestic currency is being
driven down) by a strong underlying marke[ sentiment this intervention will in the end lead to a
run on the (remaining) foreign exchange reserves of the domestic central bank. At the other
extreme, when the central bank stubbornly tries to resist a persistent appreciation of the domestic
currency (persistent decline of the exchange rate), it will encounter problems with sterilizing the
money market effect of its increased foreign exchange reserves. Eventually, the central bank will
have to tolerate an inflationary effect of the interventions. Thus, while it is assumed that the
central bank wishes to limit deviations from a target level, a flexible formulation of the target
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The target level for the exchange rate is thought of as representing past levels of the exchange
rate. This is not to say that the exchange rate was considered to be at a desirable level in previous
days. It merely allows to test whether the central banks systematically "leaned against the wind"
and tried to smooth (further) deviations from the seven-days moving average of the exchange rate.
The reaction function in equation (3) proposes a second variable to explain the volume of
intervention: the conditional variance of the respective exchange rate returns conditional on no
intervention. Time series for the conditional variance of daily DMI~-returns (in the Frankfurt and
New York market) and Yenlá-returns (in New York) are generated using the estimated parameter
values of a standard GARCH model depicted in Table l. For the time series h,''H. "M's hNe nM~s and
hHe rF.wa the unconditional or average variance of the return series for the sample considered in
Table 1, a2, is used as a starting value. It is calculated as follows o' - xl(I-a-B).
The establishment of the February 22, 1987 Louvre Accord marks the beginning of a new
exchange rate policy regime. Estimation results in Almekinders (1992) point to a marked change
in the stochastic process generating the daily DMIá-return series as of that date. Furthermore, it
appeared that the process remained relatively stable through to October 1989. Therefore, as7
Table I Maximum Likelihood Estimatesfor the parameters of the standardGARCH mode[
100 ( log .S," - log S,'i) - ao t e, t:, ~ i2,-~ - N(0, h,)
h, - a t a t;;-, 4(3 h,-~
aa x oc li IogL Q(12) QZ(12) m3 me LR(2)
ratein 0.015 0.021 0.073 0.874 -649.34 10.29 20.63 0.04 4.29 35.68
run (0.55) (2.77) (4.47) (31.51)
6-rate in 0.013 0.020 0.064 0.890 -684.79 7.47 6.88 -.09 4.65 25.94
York (0.54) (2.83) (4.13) (34.R3)
ï-r.uein -.006 0.043 0.083 0.834 -730.32 5.72 8.07 -.13 5.21 42.41
York (-.23) (3.12) (4.21) (20.23)
Nntes: t-statistics in parentbeses.
m, and ma give the sample skewness and kurtosis for the residuals, respectively.
Q(12) and Q'(12) refer to the Ljung-[lOZ ponmanteau test for up to 12'th order serial correlation in the levels and the
squares ofthe residuals respectively. The critical value for a ST-level test is 21.0.
LR(2) gives the value of the test sutistic for the likelihood ratio test under the nullhypothesis that the variance is condi-
tional homoskedastic f1v: a-0, B-O. As the altemative hypnthesis is H~: a20, B20, the LR-statistic dces not have a x'--
distribution with two degrees of freedom. T'he tabulated critical value for a 5~6-level test is 5.135 (Kodde and Palm 1986).
sample is chosen the period from February 23, 1987 through to October 31, 1989 totalling 677
observations for the Frankfurt market and 680 observations for the New York market. The
estimated ccefficients for the GARCH models shown in Table 1 are highly significant with the
exception of the coefficient in the mean equation (ao). The DMI~-rate and the yenlS-rate did not
rise or decline uniformly across the sample. The value of [he likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic in
the last column of Table l indicates that the null hypothesis Ha: a- 6- 0 can be soundly
rejected. This indirates that the random walk model with a GARCH error term fits [he data better
than the Gaussian random walk.
The variance of a variable is positive by definition. Yet, we would expect central banks to
react differently to rises in the conditional variance of exchange rate returns depending on the
level of the exchange rate, i.e. when the exchange rate is 'too high' (too 'low') central banks are
likely to respond to a rise in the conditional variance by selling (buying) foreign ezchange. In
order to facilitate a straightforward interpretation of the estimated ccefficient for the conditional
variance in the intervention reaction function we premultiplied the conditional variance h, with a
dummy variable which takes on a value I(-I) if the exchange rate is above (below) the Louvre-
equilibrium level (á l- DM 1.8255, S I- Y 153.4).8
III. Fstimation and results
The intervention reaction functions for the Bundesbank (DBB) and the Federal Reserve
System (FED) implied by the model in section I and the description of the data in section II look
as follows:
INV,""" - b„ DUM, t b, (SFR,~~ - SFR;`u) t 61 DL, h,'R . la,
INV,''"' - c„ DUM, t c, (SNY,y - SNY,~J t cT DL, h,"r t p
where ~c, is a random disturbance term, DUM, - 1(-1) if p S c 0( ? 0) and
DL, - 1 if S,oMn ~
Stoim~~~ or S,Y.NS ~ Sr.ourxer~s
- -I If




In practice, central banks are rather reluctant to intervene in the foreign exchange market.
This may stem from the fact that typical intervention efforts, which are of the order of 5100 or
~200 million, are very tiny when compared to the average daily turnover on foreign exchange
markets." As a consequence of the retative negligeability of interventions, their impact on the
course of exchange rate movements depends crucially on the strength of their announcement effect
on the expectations of private exchange market participants. Hence, it seems reasonable to assume
that the more frequent a central bank intervenes, the less attention will be paid to the message
contained in the official foreign currency operations. It follows that the central bank is faced with
a trade off. It can chose to intervene more frequently in the present with a(small) chance of
driving the current spot rate closer to the target rate andlor limiting the volatility of the spot
exchange rate. This will go at the cost of lowering the "news"-content and thus the potential
effectiveness of future interventions. Thus, by abstaining from intervention in the face of small
changes in the exchange rate and normal levels of conditional volatility the central banks can be
viewed as "investing" in the potential effectiveness of interventions to be undertaken at times the
foreign exchange market experiences some serious turbulence.
The large proportion of zero observations for the dependent variable in the intervention
reaction functions despite nonzero values of the explanatory variables is inconsistent with the
"In April 1992 the daily average of global spot market turnover net of double-counting arising
from both local and cross-border interbank operations was estimated to be á 400 billion. This im-
plies a 15 percent rise from the corresponding estimate of á350 billion for April 1989 (Bank for
International Settlements, 1993).9
continuous density specification of (4) and (5). Therefore, the use of ordinary least squares as an
estimation technique yields biased and inconsistent estimates. Rosett (1959) developed a friction
model to suitably account for relationships in which the dependent variable is insensitive to small
realizations of the explana[ory variables.'Z In matrix notation:
!NV - (XII t p) - A' if (XO f k) ~ A'
INV - 0 if A s(Xf! f~) 5 A'
INV - (Xft f w) - A if (XO t~) G A
where INV is the dependent variable, X is the matrix of explanatory variables, fi is a vector of
ccefficients, p is a vector of nortnal, i.i.d. errors and A'( ~ 0) and A( G 0) are the thresholds
which must be exceeded before the cetitral bank acts to buy or sell foreign currency, respectively.
In the actual estimation of the friction model the thresholds replace the positive and negative
constant terms in equations (4) and (5).
Maximizing the likelihood function of the friction model provides estimates of the
tolerance thresholds, the standard deviation of the disturbance term, o, and the ccefficient vector
on the explanatory variables, f!."
The tnaximum likelihood estimates for the parameters of the friction model for central
bank intervention are reported in Table 2. The Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve are clearly
'~Rosett (1959, p. 263) mentions the example of small changes in yield not leading to changes
in the holdings of a particular asset by a certain class of investors because of transaction costs.
Forbes and Mayne (1989) estimate a friction model of the prime rate. The interest rates on bank
loans under á 1,W0,000 to businesses are mostly tied to the prime rate which has a tendency to
remain unchanged despite movements in for instance the secondary market rate on large,
negotiable certificates of deposit. Feinman (1993) estimates a friction model for the volume of
daily open market operations conducted by the Federal Reserve Open Market Desk. The Desk
refrains from engaging in any transaction on roughly one day in four.
"The likelihood function of the friction model consists of three components. For the
observations for which INV is positive (first component) and the observations for which INV is
negative (third component) an ordinary probability density function applies. For the observations
with INV - 0 we know that A 5(Xít t p) 5 A'. Consequentiy,
Pr [INV, - O] - Pr [B - 5 Xf1 t p 5 9 ~] - ~ (e XD) - ~ (B - - X[J~
o a
where Pr denotes the expected probability and ~ ís the standard normal ctunulative density
function. The likelihood function can be written as follows:
~1NV . B' :tly' ~lNV . B- My'
L- I[ ! e~~ II(~(e -~) -~(B- -XD) j~ n ! e~
1N~ o a(2x) 1NV., a a ,NV „ Q (Z,~)lo
fuund to have conducted a"leaning against the wind" policy during the post-Louvre sample period
from February 23, 1987 to October 31, 1989. The ccefficients for the explanatory variable which
captures deviations of day t's opening exchange rate from the seven-days moving average have the
expected negative sign both for Bundesbank intervention in Ihe DMIá-market and for Federal
Reserve intervention in the DMIS- and yenlS-market and are statistically significant in all cases. A
one percentage point appreciation (depreciation) of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis the Deutsche Mark
above (below) its moving average on average led the Bundesbank to sell (buy) á 79.77 million in
Ihe DMIá-market and the Federal Reserve to sell (buy) ~ 106.91 million. The equivalent ftgure
for Federal Reserve intervention in response to changes in the yenl~-rate is S 99.25 million.
The estimation results indicate that both central bank actively responded to increases in the
anticipated volatility of the exchange market. In effect, the Federal Reserve's reaction to exchange
rate uncertainty was considerably stronger than that of the Bundesbank. For example, given that
the DMIá-rate was above the longer term target rate implied by the Louvre Agreement, an
increase in the conditional variance of one point, say from 0.40 to 0.41, caused by a larger than
avetage percentage change in the DMIá-rate during the previous days on average induced the
Bundesbank to sell á 2.21 million, while it led the Federal Reserve to sell S 3.84 million in the
DMIS-market, ceterrs paribus.
The estimation results confirm the seeming reluctance of central banks to intervene despite
deviations of current exchange rates from their moving average and changes in the conditional
variance of exchange rate returns. The tolerance thresholds for intervention (6' and A-, for
purchases and sales of U.S. dollars, respectively) of the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve
reported in Table 2 are all statistically significant. The thresholds for Bundesbank intervention are
stnaller than those for interventions by the Federal Reserve. This is due to the fact that on some
trading days in the sample the German central bank intervened at the fixing of the Frankfurt
market for foreign exchange in small amounts (of the order of DM 5 to 10 million). These
interventions have a technical character and are not always policy motivated. They do however
artificially lower the thresholds for Bundesbank intervention. The Fed's higher threshold, in
absolute value, for purchases of U.S. dollars could be interpreted as evidence for its concern with
the competitiveness of U.S. exporting firms. [n addition, given the already high U.S. [rade deficit,
the Federal Reserve may have been relatively more opposed to an appreciation of the U.S. dollar
vis-à-vis both the Deutsche Mark and the Japanese Yen.
An asymmetry in both Bundesbank and Federal reserve intervention policy becomes
apparent when a distinction is made between positive and negative deviations from the seven-days
moving average. From Table 2 it is obvious that both central banks tried to counteract appreciati-
ons of their own currency more strongly than depreciations. Given that our focus is on a post-
Louvre episcxle it is useful to keep in mind that Ihe I,ouvre Agreement emhcxlied a commitment to
stabilize the value of the dollar at its then prevailing level and contain the steep decline induced by
the Plaza Agreement of September 22, 1985. The Federal Reserve did indeed counteract11
depreciations of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis the German Mark and the Japanese Yen ("negative
deviations from moving average"). However, the estimation results indicate that its intervention
efforts in response to appreciations of the U.S. dollar in the DMI~- and Yl5-market exceeded
those in response to depreciations by 30 and 50 percent, respectively. It should be noted that in
the case of Federal Reserve intervention in the DMIá-market the intervention efforts are not
significantly different at usual levels of significance. For the Bundesbank it was relatively easy to
hang on tu its Louvre comminnent. By supporting the value of the dollar it simultaneously
prevented the international competitiveness of German industries from deteriorating.
IV. Conclusions
We derived a central bank intervention reaction function by combining an amended
GARCH model for the exchange rate with a loss function for the central bank. Consistent
estimation results were obtained by implementing a friction model. Thus, we could cope with the
fact that the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve refrain from engaging in any transaction in the
foreign exchange market on the majority of the trading days in the post-Louvre sample conside-
red. Using daily exchange rate and intervention data we found that the German and U.S. central
bank "leaned against the wind" in the DMI~-market and the DMIS- and Yenl~-market respective-
ly. We investigated whether the central banks take into account the well established empirical
tinding that cxchange rate volatility is predictable to some extent. Both the Bundesbank and the
Federal Reserve are found to have taken action to lower exchange market uncertainty.
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